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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

SYLVIA L. SHERWOOD

)

Plaintiff/Respondent,
T. DANIEL SHERWOOD,
Defendant/Appellant.

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

)

Case No. 881202-CA

)

District Court No. 67,254

* * * * * * *

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to review the Second Amended Decree of
Divorce entered by the Fourth Judicial District Court in this
matter on or about November 23, 1987, is vested in the Utah
Court of Appeals pursuant to R. Utah Ct. App. 3 & 4 and Utah
Code Ann.

78-2a-3 (1988).
ISSUES PRESENTED

A.

Was there sufficient evidence for the Court to

conclude that there has been a substantial change in
circumstances sufficient to increase the level of child support
from $190.00 per month to $390.00 per month?
B.

Did the Court err and/or abuse it's discretion by

considering, in it's Findings of Fact, matters relating to
property which was owned by appellant prior to his marriage to
respondent and which were awarded to him in the original decree
of divorce entered herein?
C.

Did the Court err by failing to rule on the issue of

income tax exemption and health insurance, both of which issues
were raised at the time of trial?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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CONTROLLING AUTHORITY
The following statutes are relevant to this case:
30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and
health care of parties and children - Court to
have continuing jurisdiction - Custody and Visitation - Termination of alimony - Nonmeritorious
petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered,
the court may include in it equitable orders
relating to the children, property, and parties.
The court shall include the following in every
decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for
the payment of reasonable and necessary medical
and dental expenses of the dependent children;
and
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable
cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental
care insurance for the dependant children.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning financial
responsibility for all or a portion or child care
expenses incurred on behalf of the defendant children,
necessitated by the employment or training of the
custodial parent. If the court determines that the
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependant
children would be adequately cared for, it may
include an order allowing the non-custodial parent
to provide the day care for the dependant children,
necessitated by the employment or training of the
custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction
to make subsequent changes or new orders for the
support and maintenance of the parties, the custody
of the children and their support, maintenance,
health, and dental care, or the distribution of the
property as is reasonable and necessary.
78-45-2. Definitions.
As used in this act:
(4)
the age
whatever
a living

"Child11 means a son or daughter under
of 18 years and a son or daughter of
age who is incapacitated from earning
and without sufficient means.

. . .

(8) "Earnings" means compensation paid or
payable for personal services, whether denominated
as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise,
and specifically include periodic payment pursuant
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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policies of any type. Earnings shall specifically
include all gain derived from capital, from labor,
or from both combined, including profit gained
through sale or conversion of capital assets.
78-45-3. Duty of Man.
Every man shall support his child; and he shall
support his wife when she is in need.
78-45-4. Duty of woman.
Every woman shall support her child; and she shall
support her husband when he is in need.
78-45-7. Determination of amount of support Assessment formula for temporary support.
(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the
amount granted by prior court order unless there
has been a material change of circumstance on the
part of the obligor or obligee.
(2) When no prior court order exists, or a
material change in circumstances has occurred, the
court, in determining the amount of prospective
support, shall consider all relevant factors
including but not limited to:
(a) the standard of living and situation of
the parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the
parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the need of the obligee;
(f) the age of the parties;
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for
the support of others.
(4) In determining the amount of prospective
support on an ex parte or other motion for temporary support, the court shall use a uniform statewide assessment formula, adjusted for regional differences, prior to rendering the support order.
The formula shall provide for all relevant factors
which can be readily identified and shall allow
for reasonable deductions from obligor's earnings
for taxes, work related expenses, and living expenses. The assessment formula shall be established
by the Department of Social Services and periodically reviewed by the Judicial Council under Subsection 78-3-21 (3).
Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings.
. . .

(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence.
When issues not raised by the pleading are
tried by express or implied consent of the parties,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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they shall be treated in all respects as if they
had been raised in the pleadings....
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant/appellant appeals from the provisions of the
Second Amended Decree of Divorce governing child support,
maintenance of health, accident and dental insurance and the
dependency exemption, which Second Amended Decree was entered
on November 23, 1987, by the Fourth Judicial District Court,
Utah County, State of Utah, Judge George E. Ballif, presiding.
On November 23, 1987, over the objections of counsel for
appellant, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and. Second Amended Decree of Divorce (R. 14
Si R. 22). Under the provisions of the Second Amended Decree,
appellant was ordered to increase his monthly child support
payment from $190.00 per month to $390.00 per month (R. 26).
In addition, by failing to rule on the issue, the Court
continued in effect appellant's obligation to pay all medical
dental, optical and other health care expenses for the minor
child, and failed to rule on which of the parties ought to
claim the child as a dependency exemption for tax purposes.
Appellant was previously married to Cheralee Schumann
Sherwood, which marriage ended in divorce on or about January
13, 1983.

Pursuant to the decree of divorce entered therein

appellant was ordered to pay permanent alimony in the sum of
approximately $450.00 per month (R. 1&2).

Said order of

support remains in full force and effect.
Subsequently, appellant married respondent herein.
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The

entered on or about the 11th day of January, 1985 (R. 5 ) . At
the time of entry of the Decree of Divorce, respondent was
pregnant.

There was a question as to whether appellant was the

father of the child, therefore, no obligation for child support
was assessed, pending a determination of paternity.
Subsequently it was determined that appellant was the father of
the child.

In April, 19 85, an Amended Decree of Divorce was

entered, ordering appellant, among other things to pay child
support in the sum of $190.00 per month (R. 7 ) . On or about
the 17th day of June, 1987 appellant filed a Petition for
Modification requesting that the court modify the amended
decree, to allow appellant specified times of visitation with
the minor child.

Respondent filed a counter-petition

requesting the court to increase the level of child support
from $190.00 per month to $450.00 per month, alleging that a
substantial change of circumstances had occurred since entry of
the Amended Decree of Divorce in April of 1985.
At the time of the entry of the Amended Decree of Divorce
respondent was employed and was earning $3.65 per hour
(Transcript at 95 L.21).

In addition, respondent's 1984 income

tax return reflected a gross income of $6,444.00, or an average
gross monthly income of $520.00 (Exh. 35). Respondent's sworn
affidavit filed with the court on November 16, 1984 claimed
monthly expenses of $1,462.00 per month (Exh. 6 ) .
Appellant, in his sworn affidavit at the time of the
divorce, represented to the Court that he was receiving a
monthly draw from his accounting business in the amount of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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$2,349.00 per month, and monthly expenses of $2,706.58 per
month (Exh. 19).

In addition, appellant filed with the court

his personal financial statement which showed a negative net
worth of $19,971.95 (Exh. 19). This was the relevant financial
information before the court in determining the issue of child
support at the time of entry of the Amended Decree of Divorce.
Due to the short duration of the marriage, (45 days), the
court awarded each of the parties those items of property each
brought into the marriage in addition to any debts and
obligations owing thereon.

In addition appellant was ordered

to assume all of the marital debts and obligations.
At the trial on respondent's counter-petition for
modification, the evidence showed that respondent's gross
income had increased from $6,444.00 per year at the time of the
divorce to $17,056.00 per year.
15-25 & LL. 1-6).

(Transcript at P. 99 & 100 LL.

Respondent alleged that her living expenses

for herself and the minor child had increased from $1,462.00 to
$1,722.00 per month (Exh. 8 ) .
Appellant testified that his gross income for calendar
year 1986, which was the most current information available at
the time of trial, was $14,907.68 (Exh. 16).

In addition his

personal financial statement as of July 21, 1987 reflected a
negative net worth of $42,534.31 (Exh. 34).

Appellant

attributed the increased negative net worth to a substantial
reduction in his business income, and the continued necessity
of having to borrow money to keep his business operating.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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During cross examination there were substantial
discrepancies between respondent's representations contained in
her financial declaration and her actual monthly expenses.

In

her financial declaration respondent alleged that her monthly
telephone bill was $100.00 (Transcript at P. 108 LL 22-24).

In

court, however, she testified that her basic telephone service
cost only $24.00 per month. (Transcript at P. 108 L 25 & P. 109
L 1&2).

Respondent alleged that her combined monthly Utah

Power and Light and Mountain Fuel utilities cost $165.00 per
month (Transcript P. 110 LL 17-19), whereas respondent's
returned checks introduced at the time of trial showed a
combined average monthly cost of $54.00 per month

(Transcript

p.110 LL 21-24). Respondent alleged child care expenses of
$312.00 per month (Transcript at P. 116 L.21).

At the time of

trial, copies of returned checks introduced into evidence
indicated monthly child care costs of approximately $90.00 per
month (Transcript at P. 116 LL 12-19).
Appellant appeals from the trial court's order increasing
the level of child support; failing to order respondent to
maintain health and dental insurance for the minor child; and
failing to enter a definitive order regarding the dependency
exemption.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial Court may adjust from time to time, the
respectivefs parties' obligation for child support upon finding
that there has been a substantial and material change in
circumstances.

When such a finding is made, the amount of
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support ordered to be paid must not be excessive and must be
supported by the evidence presented.

In this instance the

trial court abused it's discretion by increasing the level of
child support for the reason that the court received no
credible evidence to support the substantial increase in
support.
The court erred during it's deliberation about appellant's
ability to pay child support by considering ownership of
personal property which he owned prior to his marriage to
respondent and which had been awarded to appellant in the
decree of divorce.
The trial court erred in it's refusal to enter an order on
the issue of which of the parties ought to be required to
maintain health and dental insurance for the minor child.

The

evidence at trial was that such insurance was available to
respondent at no cost, whereas the cost of such insurance to
appellant was substantial.

Furthermore, the court erred in not

entering an order regarding which of the parties ought to be
granted the dependency exemption for income tax purposes.
ARGUMENT
1.

THE COURT ABUSED IT'S DISCRETION BY INCREASING
THE LEVEL OF CHILD SUPPORT.

The trial Court may adjust from time to time the
respective parties' obligation for child support upon finding
that there has been a substantial and material change in
circumstances.

Even when such a finding is made, the amount of

support ordered to paid must not be excessive and must be
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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discretion by substantially increasing the amount of child
support when no credible evidence was introduced to support
it's ruling.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of modification
of child support orders in Mitchell v. Mitchell, 668 P.2d 561
(Utah 1983), wherein the court stated that the party
petitioning the Court for an increase in child support has the
burden to prove a substantial and material change in
circumstances since entry of the decree of divorce.
The evidence introduced at the time of trial was
insufficient for respondent to meet that burden.

The record

reflects that respondent's income at the time of entry of the
original decree of divorce, was $6,444.00 per year. (Exh. 35).
Respondent testified that her income annualized for calendar
year 1986 was $17,056.00 per year, an increase of $10,612.00,
or 165%. (Transcript at P.99 & 100 LL 15-25 & LL 1-6).

During

the same period, based upon affidavits filed with the Court,
respondent's monthly expenses increased from $1,462.00 per
month to $1,722.00 per month an increase of $260.00 per month,
or 18%. (Exh. 6 & 8 ) .
On cross examination respondent testified her itemized
expenses, including telephone, electrical, gas and child care,
were substantially overstated.

Based on her in court

testimony, respondent's alleged monthly expenses, considering
only the four items above, is reduced by $409.00.

Furthermore,

based on respondent's failure to present any documentary
evidence in court at the time of trial, should make the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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remaining expense items in her affidavit suspect.

During cross

examination respondent testified as follows (Transcript at P.
113 & 114, LL. 22-25 & LL 1-4)
Q. You indicate in this financial declaration
that your telephone bill was $90.00 a month
when in fact average service is only $20.00
a month. What I am getting at quite frankly,
Miss Sherwood, is that you either made some
very gross mistakes and errors on the financial
declaration or you inflated the figures, Now
which could it be?
A. I could have made a mistake.
By comparison, appellant's income at the time of entry of the
original decree of divorce and the subsequent amended decree of
divorce was $2,349.00, which represented his "draw" from his
accounting business (Exh. 19). That draw translates into a
annual gross income of $28,188.00.

Appellant's income for

calendar year 1986 was $14,907.68, a decrease of $13,281.00 or
47%.
The trial court may fashion such equitable orders for
child support as is reasonable and necessary.

In doing so the

court must consider not only the needs of the child, but also
the ability of the parent to pay.

Anderson v. Anderson, 172

P.2d 132 (1946).
The decision of the trial court will be disturbed only
where the evidence so preponderates against the trial court's
findings that it appears to be unjust, inequitable, or contrary
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to the evidence and therefore an abuse of discretion.

McBroom

v. McBroom, 384 P.2d 961, 962 (Utah 1963) (husband and wife
appeal support and property division); Owen v. Owen, 579 P.2d
911, 913 (Utah 1978) (petition to modify decree to increase
child support).

Support awarded must not be excessive, must be

supported by the evidence, and the basis of the award must be
reflected in the court's findings. Harris v. Harris, 585 P.2
435, 437 (Utah 1978); Carlson v. Carlson, 584 P. 2d 864, 865-67
(Utah 1978).
It is true that a child's needs increase as he or she gets
older.

However, in this case, a mere two years after entry of

the original child support order, there is no credible evidence
supporting additional financial needs for the child. Although
respondent made certain allegations about increased child
related costs, she failed to introduce any evidence to justify
her claim, alleging that she had failed to bring the
information to court (Transcript at P. 116 & 117 LL 25 & LL 1 &
2).

The burden is on petitioner to demonstrate by a

preponderance of the evidence that there has been a substantial
and material change in circumstances.

A short advance in age

alone is not such a substantial change in circumstances as
would warrant modification of a decree of divorce.

Gale vs.

Gale, 258 P.2d 986 (Utah).
Both parents have an obligation to support their children.
Owen vs. Owen, 579 P.2d 911 (Utah). However, that obligation is
not without limits.

A review of the evidence introduced at

trial shows that although the relative disparity of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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parties1 income has changed significantly, it has changed in
favor of respondent.

Gale, 258 P. 2d 986.

At the time of the

divorce, the disparity in income in terms of dollars was
$21,744.00 in favor of petitioner.

At the time of the trial on

respondent's petition for modification the disparity in the
parties1 income was $2,149.00.

A substantial turnaround, and

proof of respondent's increased ability to contribute to the
support of the parties' minor child.

A Court's power to modify

a decree of divorce is not without limit.

In this case the

trial court, and for reason know only to the court, arbitrarily
ignored the overwhelming evidence.

In DeVas vs. Noble, 369

P.2d 290, (Utah, 1962) our Supreme Court concluded that the
trial court cannot stubbornly ignore and refuse to be guided by
credible uncontradicted evidence.

The evidence presented by

appellant is not only the most credible evidence it's
essentially the only evidence presented at the time of trial.
During the discovery phase of these proceedings, appellant was
asked to provide copies of cancelled checks so that appellant
could verify her monthly expenses.

Appellant's response was,

Plaintiff objects to producing her bank statements
and checks as they contain personal information which
is not a proper matter of discovery. (R. 29).
It was only after a motion to compel was filed that she
reluctantly supplied some of the documents requested.
Testimony at the time of the trial, was that in addition
to his obligation to pay child support to respondent, appellant
is presently married and his present wife is pregnant.

In

addition he has a continuing alimony obligation from a previous
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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marriage in the amount of approximately $420.00 per month (R. 1
& 2 ) . The trial court blindly ignored appellant's obligation
under the previous decree.

UCA 78-45-7 provides that in

determining the amount of prospective support the court shall
consider in addition to other relevant factors "the
responsibility of the obligor for the support of others."

The

trial court must recognize appellant's obligation not only to
support his present family, but the court must also take into
account his continuing alimony obligation from his first
marriage. Oppenshaw vs. Oppenshaw, 639 P2d. 177, (Utah).
In it's Decision dated August 11, 1987 (R. 8 ) , the trial
court argued that a significant factor in it's decision to
increase appellant's child support obligation was due to
appellant's past capacity to borrow money (R. 10). This in
spite of the fact that appellant testified that he was
overextended, that most of the borrowed funds were used to
sustain his business and his present family (Transcript at P.
14 LL 1 0 - 1 4 ) and that he was in the process of attempting to
eliminate his debts.

Our Utah Supreme Court has never embraced

the notion that credit, whether good credit or bad credit,
should ever be a factor in determining a parties' obligation to
support his or her children.

If that were the status of the

law, many children in this state would be deprived of the
benefit of support from their parents merely on the basis that
he or she has "bad credit".

That notion would invalidate the

long standing, position of the courts that a parent's first and
foremost obligation is to provide support for his or her
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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children, regardless of other obligations.

Appellant

recognized that obligation when he so testified at the trial
(Partial Transcript at P. 18 & 19, LL 22-25 & LL 1-3).
UCA 78-45-2(8) defines earnings upon which child support
shall be based, as follows:
(8) "Earnings" means compensation paid or payable
for personal services, whether denominated as
wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise,
and specifically include periodic payment pursuant
to a pension or retirement programs, or insurance
policies of any type. Earnings shall specifically
include all gain derived from capital, from labor,
or from both combined, including profit gained
through sale or conversion of capital assets.
Neither the statute or any case law makes reference to
"ability to borrow" or "good credit" as a criteria for
determining child support.

Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P. 2d 1019

(Utah 1987) is analagous to the issue presented in this case.
In Ebbert plaintiff/appellant appealed a lower court's order
for child support, arguing that the lower court failed to take
into consideration the fact that during the marriage,
defendant/appellant received large gifts of money from his
parents.

In upholding the lower courts ruling that such gifts

of money should not be considered in determining
defendant/appellant's obligation to pay child support, this
court stated,
Such a consideration would be tantamount to
imputing the wealth and income of her parents
to defendant, and thereby imposing a duty of
child support on the grandparents. Such a
result is contrary to the concepts of parental
duty and common sense. The court acted well
within its discretion in formulating an award
of child support and we therefore affirm the
award.
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The same reasoning can be applied in this case.

For the

trial court to consider the ability to borrow, or for that fact
to consider borrowed money in a parties' ability to pay child
support is contrary to common sense.

If the trial court's

theory is adopted, then the flip side of the trial court's
argument would suggest that when a party was subsequently
required to repay the borrowed money, his child support
obligation would be reduced accordingly.
absurd.

That is patently

Appellant's child support obligation should be based

on the parties' respective gross income or earnings as defined
by statute, and for the trial court to base it's decision on
appellant's capacity to borrow money is equally "contrary to
the concepts of parental duty and common sense.'1 Ebbert, 744
P.2d 1019.
2.

THE COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING APPELLANT'S
PERSONAL PROPERTY IN DETERMING CHILD SUPPORT.

The court erred and/or abused it's discretion when in it's
deliberation and ruling concerning appellant's ability to pay
an increased amount of child support it considered and ruled on
matters relating to property owned by appellant prior to his
marriage to respondent and awarded to him in the original
decree of divorce. (Transcript of Hearing P. 16 & 17, LL 23-25
& LL 1-14)
At the time of entry of the original decree of divorce,
appellant was awarded certain items of real and personal
property, all of which he owned prior to his 45 day marriage to
respondent.

The items awarded to appellant at the time of the

divorce included
horses,
camper,
a pickup
truck, a
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car and a boat.

In it's Decision (R. 11 & 12) and in it's

Findings of Fact (R. 12), which findings were filed and entered
over the objection of counsel for appellant, the court, in
concluding that there had been a substantial change in
circumstances, placed a great deal of emphasis on the fact that
appellant owned these same items of personal property at the
time of trial.
In Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 580 P. 2d 1090 (Utah, 1978),
in addressing the issue of modification of a decree of divorce,
the Utah Supreme Court re-stated it's commitment to the
proposition that for the court to modify an existing decree of
divorce, the moving party must show a substantial change in
circumstances.

The Court stated,

This court is clearly committed to the proposition
that in order to modify a prior decree the
moving party must show a substantial change
in circumstances. In the absence of such
a showing, the decree shall not be modified
and the matters previously litigated and
incorporated therein cannot be collaterally
attacked in face of the doctrine of res judicata.
McLane v. McLane, 570 P. 2d 692 (Utah, 1972); Porco v. Porco,
79 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (1988). With the exception of an
automobile, which appellant was compelled to purchase because
his previous car blew up (Transcript at P. 137, LL16-21),

and

routine family expenditures, the record is void of any evidence
showing that appellant has in any way "expanded his life style"
or "enhanced his standard of living" (R. 12), (Transcript of
Hearing P. 7 & 3, LL 21-25 & LL 1-3).

Yet the court in it's

written Decision stated,
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escalating standard of living as shown by heavy
expenditures in areas such as travel, motor vehicle,
many purchases with credit lines and loans to himself
individually and his loans to his business....(R. 10).
At (R. 12) the court stated,
. . . and the fact that the defendant has
continued to increase his standard of living
and is spending substantial sums for his
comfort and enjoyment, automobiles, boats,
travel, etc., and the fact that his adjusted
gross income has nearly doubled although
his debts has increased, the court considered
that there has been a material change of
circumstance . . . .
The record does not bear out the conclusions of the court.
There was no evidence presented to the court of "heavy
expenditure for travel".

The only travel testified to by

appellant was at (Partial Transcript at P. 29 & 30, LL 25 & LL.
1-13), where appellant testified he went on his honeymoon with
his current wife which cost them gas and food and two nights
lodging in a hotel room.

The court further misinterpreted the

record at trial by concluding that appellant "spent substantial
sums for his comfort and enjoyment, automobiles, boats, travel,
etc... There is nothing in the record to substantiate this
conclusion.

The only boat owned by appellant was the one he

owned prior to his marriage to respondent.

The only automobile

he purchased was the vehicle he purchased because his other
vehicle blew up.

Furthermore, the trial courts conclusion that

his adjusted gross income nearly doubled is incorrect and
contrary to the evidence presented at the time of trial.
Appellant's life style has been substantially reduced due
to the continued necessity of having to borrow to sustain his
business asDigitized
well
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10-14).

In the Transcript of Hearing on appellants objection

to findings of fact, the trial court, in attempting to justify
consideration of personal property previously awarded to
appellant, recognized it was without legal authority when it
said,
I grant you, this is not a run-of-the-mill
case, and I don't think there is any authority
for this kind of conclusion that I came to
when I heard this evidence".
(Transcript of Hearing, P. 11 LL 3-9)
The order increasing appellant's obligation for child
support was based not on the evidence presented in court, but
rather on the court's belief that appellant's life style or
standard of living had expanded since entry of the decree of
divorce.

There is nothing on the record, however, to suggest

that is the case.

In interpreting the evidence and in entering

an Order, the court is not without limits.
584 P. 2d 864 (Utah 1985).

Carlson v. Carlson,

Whether the trial court erred in

it's application of the evidence or abused it's discretion, the
level of child support ordered in the second amended decree
should be reduced to $19 0.00 per month, the amount paid by
appellant pursuant to the amended decree originally entered.
3.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE
ISSUE OF HEALTH INSURANCE AND TAX EXEMPTION.

The trial court erred in it's refusal to enter an order on
the issue of which of the parties ought to be required to
maintain health and dental insurance for the minor child.
Furthermore, the trial court erred in it's failure to rule on
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which of the parties ought to be granted the dependency
exemption for income tax purposes.
The trial court has wide discretion in resolving issues
between the parties in divorce cases. DeRose v. DeRose, 426 P.
2d 222 (Utah 1967)
Rule 15 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
as follows:
Amendments to conform to the evidence.
When issues not raised by the pleadings are
tried by express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings . . . .
At the time of trial there was significant testimony on
the issue of health and dental insurance (Transcript at P. 102
& 103 LL 4-25 & LL 1-19).

Even though the issues were not

specifically plead, neither counsel for respondent or the court
raised any objection to the testimony.
The testimony of respondent was that as a benefit of her
employment at the Utah Transit Authority, she receives, at no
cost to her, health and dental insurance for herself and the
minor child (Transcript at P. 102 L 4 ) . The record further
shows, that appellant is presently required to maintain
insurance for the minor child and pay all deductables and
amounts not covered by insurance, in accordance with the decree
of divorce, all at a substantial monthly cost to him (R.7).
During cross examination, respondent testified that the
only reason she would not put the parties1 child on her medical
and dental insurance was because it was appellant1s
responsibility

(Transcript at P. 122, L 11). Under the
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circumstances and due to appellant's current financial
situation, equity dictates that the court ought to excercise
it's broad discretion in matters of this nature and order
respondent to maintain the health and dental insurance as long
as it is available through her employer, and order the parties'
to share the deductables.

For appellant to be required to

continue paying for health and dental insurance under these
circumstances is contrary to the best interest of the parties
and makes no sense.

Therefore, respondent should be ordered to

secure health and dental insurance for the minor child, and the
court should enter an appropriate order regarding
responsibility for deductables not paid by insurance.
Additionally, the court should rule on the issue of which of
the parties should be entitled to the dependency exemption for
tax purposes.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred by increasing appellant's child
support obligation from $190.00 per month to $390.00 per month.
The trial court's decision is not supported by the evidence and
respondent has failed to carry her burden of proving a
substantial change in circumstances.

The amount of child

support ordered was excessive, unfair and inequitable, and
appellant is without sufficient means to make the payment he
was ordered to make.
The trial court failed to rule on the issue of health and
dental insurance and income tax exemptions for the minor child.
The evidence
shows that respondent has health and dental
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insurance available to her through her employment at no cost.
Furthermore, the insurance coverage presently provided by
appellant was very costly to him.

These issues in addition to

the dependency exemption, were properly raised at the time of
trial and an appropriate order should be entered.
Accordingly the decision of Fourth Judicial District Court
should be either amended as requested herein or vacated and
remanded to the trial court with specific directions to enter
an order in accordance with this court's decision on the issues
presented.
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of September, 1988.
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